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Abstract—Using public cloud services for storing and sharing
confidential data requires end users to cryptographically protect
both the data and the access to the data. In some cases, the
identity of end users needs to remain confidential against the
cloud provider and fellow users accessing the data. As such, the
underlying cryptographic access control mechanism needs to
ensure the anonymity of both data producers and consumers.
We introduce A-SKY, a cryptographic access control extension
capable of providing confidentiality and anonymity guarantees,
all while efficiently scaling to large organizations. A-SKY
leverages trusted execution environments (TEEs) to address the
impracticality of anonymous broadcast encryption (ANOBE)
schemes, achieving faster execution times and shorter ciphertexts.
The innovative design of A-SKY limits the usage of the TEE to
the narrow set of data producing operations, and thus optimizes
the dominant data consumption actions by not requiring a
TEE. Furthermore, we propose a scalable implementation for
A-SKY leveraging micro-services that preserves strong security
guarantees while being able to efficiently manage realistic large
user bases. Results highlight that the A-SKY cryptographic
scheme is 3 orders of magnitude better than state of the
art ANOBE, and an end-to-end system encapsulating A-SKY
can elastically scale to support groups of 10000 users while
maintaining processing costs below 1 second.
I. INTRODUCTION
Relying on cloud services for storing content emerges as an
efficient method for organizations to cut and adapt functional
costs. As cloud service providers cannot be fully trusted [1],
data owners shall cryptographically protect their data before
sending it to storage providers, by encrypting it with secret
keys. Furthermore, data owners grant access to well-defined
groups of users to create and consume that data. Due to
lack of trust in cloud providers, cryptographic access control
mechanisms are used instead to store and enforce that only
valid users can access the keys and, consequently, the data.
Sometimes, not only data but also the identity of users
is sensitive and has to be protected. Consider for example
military organizations that define access groups based on
security clearances. Besides protecting the shared information
that is specific to a clearance level (e.g., confidential, secret
and top secret), users sharing the same clearance level do not
know each other. Likewise, dispatching confidential medical
programs (e.g., for HIV patients) needs to ensure that patients’
privacy is guaranteed [2] and therefore fellow patients cannot
infer their identity. Moreover, Virtual data rooms (VDRs) [3]
used for exchanging confidential documents during business
acquisitions not only need to enforce a high-level of access
control, but also to protect stakeholders’ identities.
Existing research in the area of security of cloud-backed
storage systems covers cryptographic access control for data
confidentiality and authenticity [4]–[6], but not anonymity.
These systems rely on public key cryptography mapping user
identities and enveloping symmetric keys that protect the actual
shared content. Differently, confidential systems focusing on
group communication offer anonymity guarantees by group
key exchange methods [7], requiring all active group members
to be present and participate in a multi-phase protocol (e.g.,
Diffie-Hellman) each time a key is derived. Such an approach
is indeed suitable for instant group communication, but
impractical for file sharing that generally does not require the
online presence of users. Moreover, theoretical anonymous file
sharing extensions have been hypothesized [8], [9] without
ever turning into functional systems. The need for anonymous
sharing of confidential content was practically addressed in
an unsophisticated manner by GNU privacy guard (GPG).
The approach implemented by GPG is to drop any public
key mapping from the resulting ciphertext, and therefore keep
no reference to the identity of the actual content’s recipients.
The main drawback of this solution happens at decryption
time, when the recipient needs to perform many asymmetric
decryption trials until the portion of the ciphertext matching
his private key is found (if any). As pointed by our preliminary
benchmark (§III, Table I), GPG works well for groups of few
users but quickly becomes impractical for larger ones.
As an alternative approach, trusted execution environments
(TEEs) such as Intel Software guard extensions (SGX) [10] or
ARM TrustZone [11] have seen rapid adoption during the last
few years. Data and computations happening within such trusted
environments cannot be seen from outside. A number of secu-
rity systems profited from TEE integration in order to achieve
practical performance while targeting strict threat models [12],
[13]. Envisioning TEE usage as a building block for anonymous
sharing systems is therefore natural. However, TEEs and more
specifically Intel SGX come with side costs, notably due to
transitioning latency between trusted and untrusted zones, as
well as page swapping when exceeding the limited memory size
of the enclave page cache (EPC). In addition, one cannot rely on
widespread adoption of such enabling technology. Instead, one
needs to consider the participants’ heterogeneity in an anony-
mous sharing scheme, including various microprocessor archi-
tectures, mobile users or even Internet of things (IoT) devices.
In this paper, we propose an anonymous access control
scheme that leverages SGX as TEE only for a narrow scope
and deployment: enforcing anonymity during the publishing
operation (i.e., upon writing). Our scheme does not require
a TEE on the user side for performing the read operation,
nor does it require that users connect to a designated TEE
proxy. Moreover, by leveraging TEEs, we can circumvent
assumptions of state-of-the-art theoretical anonymous sharing
schemes [8] and considerably improve the performance of
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cryptographic operations. To demonstrate the feasibility of
our solution, we propose a scalable system design leveraging
micro-services that can elastically scale depending on the
access control and data content workloads.
Even though our work targets file sharing over untrusted
cloud storages, the proposed solution can be adapted to a
wider spectrum of anonymous broadcast contexts such as
media streaming or peer-to-peer networks.
Our evaluation highlights that our construct is faster
by 3 orders of magnitude compared to state-of-the-art
anonymous broadcast encryption (ANOBE) [8]. Furthermore,
our end-to-end system implementation, A-SKY, can adequately
scale to cope with a similar number of administrative and
user operations that a realistically-sized organization would
experience (see §VI).
In short, we propose the following original contributions:
(i) We define a theoretical anonymous cryptographic access
control extension that relies on TEEs for a minimal subset
of operations (i.e., writes but not reads). To the best of
our knowledge, our approach is the first to leverage TEEs
for the construction of ANOBE primitives. (ii) We propose
an end-to-end system design, incorporating our theoretical
construct and leveraging micro-services that can scale
according to the undergoing workloads. (iii) We implement
and evaluate the system, first in isolation showing its benefits
against state-of-the-art cryptographic schemes, and secondly by
benchmarking its scaling capabilities and practical feasibility.
The paper continues by introducing the actors and
adversarial threat model (§II). We then discuss the state of
the art and open challenges (§III), present the design of our
solution (§IV) and its implementation (§V), evaluate our
prototype within isolated micro-benchmarks and large-scale
macro-benchmarks (§VI), and finally conclude (§VII).
II. MOTIVATION
We provide an overview of the assumptions and security
objectives of file sharing systems that guarantee data
confidentiality and user anonymity.
1) Model and Use Case: We target file sharing between
users represented by humans or software agents. We consider
that users are uniquely identified within the premises of an
organization. Users are organized into uniquely identifiable
groups by organization-specific considerations and policies.
We consider a separation between the group access control
and group content management by both functional and threat
factors. Group access control represents group memberships
operations and is performed by administrators. Administrative
operations consist in adding and removing users from groups.
Group content management represents creating and consuming
files by group members. A user can hold one or both roles
of writer and reader within one or multiple groups. The
remote storage is a typical cloud object storage that can store
uniquely-identified large binary objects (e.g., Amazon S3).
Exemplifying Use Case. Virtual data rooms (VDRs) [3]
enable a tightly controlled exchange repository of electronic
documents for company mergers and acquisitions (M&A).
Thanks to VDRs, the seller, supporting parties assisting the
seller, and acquisition bidders can confidentially exchange
documents (e.g., terms, valuation) through an untrusted
remote storage medium. The seller acts as administrator and
enforces access control. Active user roles are constituted by
writers (the seller and supporting parties) and readers (the
bidders). As enforced by confidentiality agreements, supporting
parties operate under the umbrella of the seller, and remain
unidentifiable from each other. Similarly, the seller can conceal
the identity of bidders among themselves. As such, inner
anonymity guarantees need to be enforced within the writers
(supporting parties) and readers (bidders) groups, while outer
anonymity needs to withstand against any actor who is not
involved in the M&A process. Additionally, any withdrawing
bidder or misbehaving supporting party can be revoked by the
seller, and therefore unable to access the document corpus. The
operation load of such scenario follows typical workloads of
cloud sharing services (e.g., Dropbox, Google Drive), modeled
by YCSB [14] in our macro-benchmark evaluation (§VI-2).
2) Security Objectives: We specify four high-level security
properties for confidential and anonymous file sharing systems.
(i) Confidentiality and Authenticity: The secrecy of the
content of shared files is exclusive for the group members.
Recipients should be able to check the integrity and
provenance of shared content.
(ii) Forward Secrecy: The compromise of a group secret
should not compromise past sharing sessions within the
same group.
(iii) Recipients Privacy: No recipient except the group
administrator should be able to infer the identities of
other recipients (i.e., readers).
(iv) Sender Privacy: No recipient except the group
administrator should be able to infer the sender’s (i.e.,
writer) identity.
3) Threats: Revoked users and users external to the system
behave arbitrarily. They try to discover shared content and
group members identities. To do so, they can intercept,
decipher and alter exchanged messages (i.e., Dolev-Yao [15]
adversarial model).
User anonymity is not only endangered by external
adversaries, but also internally by considering peer group
members. As such, we consider that active users that can
rightfully decrypt group content are able to launch attacks
with the goal of inferring peer members identities. To do so,
they can make use of unlimited attack trials adapted to their
adversarial strategy. We therefore consider that the proposed
solution should satisfy the strong security notion of adaptive
chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2). A solution that fulfills
such guarantees also satisfies weaker security notions of
non-adaptive chosen ciphertext or plaintext attacks.
The storage provider behaves in an honest-but-curious
manner. As such, it can try to observe the incoming and
outgoing data flows with the goal of discovering the actual
content and the identity of the users accessing the data, all
while providing service. In order to break the confidentiality
guarantee, revoked users can collude with the cloud storage
to discover content created after their revocation.
Finally, our privacy model enforces the anonymity guarantee
only with respect to user identities. We consider hiding the
size of groups, how often members communicate and the size
of the content that they exchange as out-of-scope.
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III. RELATED WORK
This section discusses related work and open challenges in
the domain of cryptographic cloud storage and access control,
as well as trusted execution environments.
Cryptographic Cloud Storages and Access Control. In
recent years, a number of storage and sharing system designs
have been proposed for mitigating the lack of trust in cloud
providers. DepSKY [16] proposes an object store interface
that can be used on the client side to encrypt and redundantly
store ciphertext on multiple untrusted storages. The encryption
keys are split by using a secret sharing scheme [17] and
dispersed over multiple storage systems that do not collude
with each other. SCFS [1] extends the client-side encryption
and cloud redundancy of DepSKY by using a trusted metadata
coordination service that also encapsulates access control.
Some systems follow a different avenue by cryptographically
enforcing access control using key enveloping. Also referred to
as hybrid encryption [4], the technique consists in encrypting
data with a symmetric key that is then itself encrypted with
public key encryption. For example, CloudProof [5] proposes
a client-side encrypted cloud storage that solves access control
by using broadcast encryption [18] to envelope two keys:
the first is used for decrypting (i.e., reads) and the second
one for signing (i.e., writes). Differently, REED [19] uses
attribute-based encryption [20] to envelope the symmetric
keys that are protecting de-duplicated content. However,
the key-enveloping technique was argued by Garrison et
al. [4] as impractical when target usage conditions are highly
dynamic. IBBE-SGX [6] demonstrates that the approach can
be implemented within dynamic conditions when leveraging
trusted execution environments (TEEs). Yet, none of the
above constructions considers an enriched threat model for
preserving both confidentiality and anonymity.
Confidential Messaging Systems. Encrypted messaging
systems share a common initial phase with our cloud file
sharing model, by requiring the construction of a group key
that protects group communication. Popular messaging systems
(e.g., WhatsApp, Threema, Signal) use a Diffie-Hellman (DH)
group key agreement and derivation [21]. Such protocols
require all active participants to contribute to the creation of
the group key, albeit without providing anonymity guarantees.
Pung [7] uses private information retrieval (PIR) in conjunction
to a group DH key derivation, thus achieving anonymity. Such
a mechanism is different from our target model, in which
active users do not need to participate in the creation of the
group key, no matter the number of groups they belong to.
Pretty Good Privacy. In practical systems, the popular Pretty
good privacy (PGP) [22] program, used for cryptographic
protection of file or emails, addressed the anonymity criteria
with a simple solution. In anonymous mode (or hidden
recipient as called by PGP), after performing the symmetric
encryption of the content and public key encryptions of the
symmetric key, all the public key mappings are dropped from
the resulting ciphertext. As such, an outside adversary cannot
infer the public keys of the recipients. At decryption time, as
the recipients have no pointer to their key-envelope ciphertext
fragment, they need to perform several private key decryption
trials until they succeed (n2 trials on average, where n is the
TABLE I: GPG operations latency in hidden recipient mode.
Group size Encrypt [s] Avg. decrypt [s] Size [kB]
10 0.13 0.6 5.3
102 0.7 5.8 16.5
103 12 60 129
group size). Table I presents results of a simple benchmark
of GPG (v. 1.4.2) in hidden recipient mode. One can observe
that encryption and—even more notably—decryption have
an impractical cost of 12 and 60 s respectively for groups of
1000 members. Moreover, the inner implementation of PGP’s
hidden recipient mode is reputed as insecure against chosen
ciphertext attacks [8], our targeted threat model.
Anonymous Broadcast Encryption. The theoretical problem
of devising a cryptographic scheme that can guarantee both
confidentiality and anonymity is referred to as anonymous (or
private) broadcast encryption (ANOBE). Theoretical research
literature proposes a number of such schemes, however
without assessing their practicality within real systems.
The private broadcast encryption proposed by Barth et al. [8]
(denoted hereafter BBW, per the authors’ initials) achieves inner
and outer anonymity, in addition to providing IND-CCA guar-
antees. Their construction extends the public key enveloping
model of PGP, by incorporating strongly unforgeable signa-
tures [23] such that an active attacker who is member of the
group cannot reuse the envelope to broadcast arbitrary messages
to the group. Moreover, to decrease the number of decryption
trials, they propose the construction of publicly-known labels,
unique for each member of every single encryption operation,
by relying on the security assumption of DH. The ciphertext
fragments created by the key enveloping process are therefore
ordered by their label. During decryption, after reconstructing
the label, the user can seek the corresponding ciphertext frag-
ment in logarithmic time before performing a single asymmetric
decryption. The scheme was further extended by Libert et al. [9]
by suggesting the use of tag-based encryption [24] to hint users
to their ciphertext fragment. To the best of our knowledge, no
practical system has integrated tag-based encryption in practice.
As pointed out by our comparison benchmark (§VI-1),
BBW [8] can handle a key enveloping throughput of only
few hundreds of users per second. Such a limitation requires
the exploration of alternative constructions that can scale to
realistic access control workloads.
Trusted Execution Environments. Recently, TEEs gathered
considerable interest as an approach for solving the otherwise
difficult problem of securely hosting services in the cloud, while
making sure that the infrastructure provider has no knowledge
of the data it handles. Examples include performing map reduce
computations [12], machine learning algorithms [25] or analyt-
ics [26], while offering confidentiality guarantees to end users.
A popular choice of TEE technology is Intel Software guard
extensions (SGX). It defines the concept of enclave as an
isolated unit of data and code execution that cannot be accessed
even by privileged code (e.g., the operating system) [10].
Enclaves can be attested, that is, proving that the code that
runs is the one intended, and that it is running on a genuine
Intel SGX platform. It seems therefore natural to rely on SGX
as building block for an anonymous sharing system. A naı¨ve
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Fig. 1: A-SKY solution overview. A-SKY monitor services are
ACCESSCONTROL (A) and WRITERSHIELD (W).
approach would be to require end users to use this enabling
technology and perform any access control related operations
in full isolation. We argue that this approach is impractical due
to the heterogeneity of end users computing platforms, which
might not be necessarily equipped with SGX capabilities.
A different approach that makes use of TEEs is to proxy all
the access control, and therefore the read and write operations,
through a broker service that runs within enclaves. However,
we claim that given the memory and computational limitations
of SGX enclaves (e.g., trusted computing base (TCB) size,
trusted/untrusted transition latency), it is far from trivial to
develop such a proxy service able to scale and sustain a
high data throughput, considering dynamic access control
operations [4]. While achieving scale-out by micro-services
that run on top of Intel SGX is possible in a containerized
environment [27], our challenge is to define an optimal
architecture for an anonymous sharing system that incorporates
SGX as TEE with minimal performance overhead.
IV. A-SKY
Our solution conceptually relies on two paradigms: a
cryptographic key management solution and a data delivery
protocol, both designed to target an increased system
performance, covering data confidentiality and user anonymity
guarantees. We describe our solution by first having an overall
look into the proposed architecture. We continue by detailing
the design of each system operation. Finally, we briefly discuss
the security guarantees of our scheme.
1) Architectural Overview: A-SKY leverages Intel SGX as
a TEE. In order to avoid passing all the system operations
through a TEE-enabled monitor, we propose a design in
which only data owners (i.e., writers) are constrained to
pass through such a proxy. Readers anonymously consume
confidential content without needing to pass through the
TEE-enabled monitor, therefore not incurring in service time
penalties. The benefits of using a monitor exclusively for
write operations are manifold. First, the monitor acts as an
outbound trusted authority (TA) authenticating all the content
passing through. Second, it can mask the identities of data
writers. Third, as the monitor executes in a TEE, traditional
anonymous key management schemes [8], [9] can be modified
to accommodate a new entity of trust for the key enveloping
operation, therefore allowing more efficient operations.
Fig. 1 displays the overview of A-SKY solution. The
A-SKY monitor sits in between end-users and the cloud
storage and is logically split in two roles. First, it provides
a cryptographic mechanism for storing and enforcing
access control to the data, by offering a cryptographic key
management solution (the ACCESSCONTROL service). Second,
upon successful access verification, it acts as an outgoing
proxy for write operations (the WRITERSHIELD service). As
system scalability is of paramount importance, the two logical
entities (ACCESSCONTROL and WRITERSHIELD services)
can independently adapt to undergoing load.
Key Management. The first building block of our design is
a cryptographic key management solution. Data owners have
to write content through the TEE-enabled monitor such that
only authorized readers (who are not passing through the TEE
monitor) can decrypt the data, all while having anonymity
guarantees. In traditional anonymous key sharing solutions [8],
a TA performs two operations: setting up the key management
system and extracting user private keys. The operations of key
enveloping together with content encryption and decryption
are performed by end users. As such, public key cryptographic
primitives are employed so that end users can cryptographically
protect content for other users, whose identities are represented
by public keys. Differently, our model that leverages a TEE as
an outgoing monitor requires that the TA does not only set up
the system and extracts user keys, but also executes the key
enveloping operation, which in the traditional assumptions was
executed by end users. This change of assumption therefore
allows us to use a much simpler cryptographic construct to
achieve the same result as traditional schemes. Concretely,
the TA can directly make use of users’ secret keys during
the key-enveloping operation. As such, this shared secret
between the TA and end users opens the way to the use of
symmetric rather then public key cryptography, and therefore
benefit from the performance advantages of the former, e.g.,
hardware acceleration and smaller ciphertexts. Second, as the
traditional scheme [8] requires the construction of a signature
key-pair per each key enveloping, under the new assumptions
we can leverage the signature of the TA. Moreover, the shared
secret between users and TA allows to construct efficient key
de-enveloping methods that increase the performance of the
decryption operation performed by end users.
Data Delivery Protocol. A-SKY allows users to write the
encrypted shared content through the WRITERSHIELD service,
which acts as a proxy. The service will check with the ACCESS-
CONTROL whether a user is granted the permission to write in
a given group. Being the case, it authenticates the outgoing con-
tent and does the writing itself. We can therefore securely store
the cloud storage credentials in the WRITERSHIELD service.
2) TEE Trust Establishment: Before relying on any service
of the A-SKY monitor, it is necessary to validate that the
service is running on a trustworthy Intel SGX platform, and that
the instances of the ACCESSCONTROL and WRITERSHIELD
services are genuine. This validation phase is performed by
administrators, who are considered fully trusted (see §II).
As such, the SGX enclaves are required to construct a proof
that incorporates the digest of the code and data inside the
enclave, signed by the fused CPU private key (also known as
quote [10]) and whose corresponding public key is retained by
Intel. The attestation packages are retrieved by the administra-
tors, who in turn check that the received digests are identical
to known ACCESSCONTROL or WRITERSHIELD digests. They
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Algorithm 1 Key enveloping (ACCESSCONTROL)
Input: user identity uid, group identifier gid, symmetric key k.
Output: an envelope ciphertext of the access control key.
1: envelope←∅
2: if uid∈groupw[gid] then
3: for all users u∈groupr[gid] do
4: usk←keys[u]
5: (ck,t)←AEusk (k)
6: envelope←envelope∪{(ck,t)}
7: end for
8: end if
9: return envelope
then contact Intel’s remote attestation service to validate that
the quote signature is indeed genuine. Upon a successful
verification, administrators rely on the remote attestation
functionality to establish a secure channel using a DH key ex-
change with both the ACCESSCONTROL and WRITERSHIELD
services [10]. This secure channel is used for subsequent
access control operations, such as user creation, addition or
removal of members from groups. Besides, administrators are
able to securely provide the cloud storage credentials to the
WRITERSHIELD service along with a long term signing key
signTA that is employed on all upcoming transiting content.
3) Operations Design: This subsection formally defines
the operations of the ACCESSCONTROL and WRITERSHIELD
services.
Let Ek(p)→c and Dk(c)→p define symmetric encryption
and decryption algorithms using the key k, where p is plaintext
and c is ciphertext. We denote by AEk(p) → (c, t) and
ADk(c,t)→{p,⊥} authenticated encryption and decryption
algorithms that, besides the above symmetric primitives, can
produce an authentication tag t proving the integrity of the
ciphertext c under the key k. We denote by Spri(p) → σ
and Vpub(p,σ)→{true,⊥} digital signature and verification
schemes employing an asymmetric key-pair (pri and pub).
Finally, H denotes a one way cryptographic function and ||
denotes the literal concatenation operation.
ACCESSCONTROL. The ACCESSCONTROL service is
responsible for storing credentials, membership information
and to enforce them. Its methods are invoked by administrators
through the secure channel established upon successfully
performing the trust attestation process (§IV-2).
The ACCESSCONTROL service generates user secret keys.
Given a unique user identifier u, the service constructs a
random secret key for the user, to whom it is sent through
a transport layer security (TLS) channel.
The ACCESSCONTROL service further exposes methods
for group management. Specifically, administrators can create
groups, as well as add or remove users from groups. Depending
on the granted access capabilities, users can hold the roles
of content reader, writer, or both. The ACCESSCONTROL
service captures such capabilities within persistent dictionaries,
groupr and groupw, which store lists of users belonging
to each group identifier (e.g., groupw[gid] = {ua, ..., uz}).
Administrators are the only entities that can modify the keys
and values of those two dictionaries.
The operation of enveloping an access key for a group
of anonymous members is denoted by KeyEnveloping and is
depicted in Alg. 1. Given the identity of the writing user, the
Algorithm 2 Proxy file (WRITERSHIELD)
Input: user identity uid, group identifier gid, file ciphertext C,
ACCESSCONTROL instance A.
1: if uid∈A.groupw[gid] then
2: σ←SsignTA(C)
3: Upload to cloud : (C,σ)
4: end if
Algorithm 3 User write file to group
Input: user identity uid, group identifier gid, file plaintext P ,
ACCESSCONTROL and WRITERSHIELD instances A and W .
1: fk←Random symmetric key
2: envelope←A.KeyEnveloping(uid,gid,fk) i.e., Alg. 1
3: cipher←Efk(P )
4: C←envelope || cipher
5: W.P roxyF ile(uid,gid,C,A) i.e., Alg. 2
Algorithm 4 User read file
Input: user secret key usk.
1: Download from cloud: (C,σ)
2: if Vpub−signTA(C,σ) 6=⊥ then
3: envelope, cipher←split(C)
4: for all pairs (kc,t) in envelope do
5: fk←ADusk (kc,t)
6: if fk 6=⊥ then
7: P←Dfk(cipher)
8: return P
9: end if
10: end for
11: end if
12: return ⊥
group unique identifier, and a symmetric key k, the algorithm
produces a ciphertext envelope that can be anonymously
de-enveloped. The operation proceeds by first checking that
the user has writing capabilities for the group (line 2). If true,
the envelope is constructed by including the ciphertext and
the authentication tag resulted from encrypting the symmetric
key using the secret key of each group member (lines 3-7).
WRITERSHIELD. As the WRITERSHIELD is the sole service
possessing the write credentials for the cloud provider, it consti-
tutes a necessary hop for uploading the file. Its main operation is
ProxyFile (Alg. 2). The method verifies that the invoking user
has write capabilities for the desired group (line 1). If positive,
the content is authenticated by using the long term TA signature
(line 2). Both parts, file ciphertext and the corresponding
signature, are finally uploaded to the cloud (line 3).
USER. The two operations performed by users are sharing a file
with a group (i.e., writing) and reading a shared file. The user
write operation leverages the TEE-enabled monitor. As shown
in Alg. 3, the user first randomly creates a symmetric key
(line 1) and asks the ACCESSCONTROL service to perform an
enveloping for this key (line 2), so that it can be anonymously
de-enveloped by any group member. He then encrypts the file
by using the prior generated symmetric key (line 3). Finally,
the two obtained ciphertexts—the key envelope and the file
ciphertext—are concatenated (line 4) and transmitted to the
WRITERSHIELD to be uploaded to the cloud storage (line 5).
Users can read files by following the procedure of Alg. 4.
As previously stated, reading operations do not involve
services running in a TEE. The first step is to download the
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Algorithm 5 Key enveloping with efficient decryption
Input: user identity uid, group identifier gid, symmetric key k.
Output: an envelope ciphertext of the access control key.
1: envelope←∅
2: if uid∈groupw[gid] then
3: nonce←Random
4: for all users u∈groupr[gid] do
5: usk←keys[u]
6: lu←H(usk || nonce)
7: (ck,t)←AEusk (k)
8: envelope←envelope∪{(lu,ck,t)}
9: end for
10: Sort envelope by l (i.e., label)
11: end if
12: return nonce || envelope
ciphertext package from the cloud storage (line 1), that can
then be validated by checking the signature (line 2) that has
been appended by the WRITERSHIELD. Should the signature
be valid, the user then splits the package between the key
envelope and the file ciphertext (line 3). Next, the user iterates
over all envelope fragments, trying to decrypt each of them
by using the user secret key usk (lines 4-5). If successful, the
obtained plaintext is the file encryption key, that the user can
use to symmetrically decrypt the file ciphertext (lines 7-8).
4) Indexing for Efficient Decryption: Following the method-
ology of traditional ANOBE schemes [8], [9], we propose a
method that can reduce the user decryption time by circumvent-
ing the need to perform several key decryption trials (line 4 of
Alg. 4) by trading it off for a slight increase in key enveloping
time and envelope size. To this end, publicly known labels are
constructed for each user fragment in the envelope, such that
the label can be recomputed by the target recipients. User keys
are ordered by labels in the envelope, so that each key can be
easily located within it and a single key decryption operation
is performed. Traditionally, the cost of building such labels
was associated to performing modular exponentiation [8] or
by using the theoretical constructs of tag-based encryption [9].
Given the change of assumption brought by A-SKY compared
to traditional ANOBE, we now have a TA running in a TEE
performing the key enveloping. It results that the shared secret
between users and the TA can also be used to construct efficient
decryption labels. A-SKY can therefore propose a much simpler
and efficient labeling mechanism by relying on the crypto-
graphic hash of the shared secret (i.e., the user secret key).
The efficient variant of key enveloping (Alg. 5) introduces
the creation of labels (line 6) as the salted hash of the
user secret key. A random nonce is generated for each key
enveloping call to be used as a salt value, publicly included in
the envelope. The envelope fragments can therefore be sorted
using the label values (line 10).
A user read operation (Alg. 6) requires the label
reconstruction (line 4) followed by a binary search of it among
the envelope fragments (line 5). When the proper label is
located, the file key can be retrieved (line 7), allowing at last
the file decryption (lines 8–9).
The trade-off brought by this efficient decryption method
is therefore an overhead of O(n · logn), due to the sorting
of the labels during the key enveloping operation. The gain
is reflected during decryption time, replacing O(n) trials of
symmetric decryption with a O(logn) binary search and a
Algorithm 6 User read file with efficient decryption
Input: user secret key usk.
1: Download from cloud : (C,σ)
2: if Vpub−signTA(C,σ) 6=⊥ then
3: nonce, envelope, cipher←split(C)
4: lu←H(usk || nonce)
5: (kc,t)← binary search for key : lu in envelope
6: if (kc,t) 6=⊥ then
7: fk←ADusk (kc,t)
8: P←Dfk(cipher)
9: return P
10: end if
11: end if
12: return ⊥
single symmetric decryption.
5) A Note on Revocation: We argue that A-SKY satisfies
the lazy revocation model [28], where a revoked user can
continue accessing data created prior to revocation but should
be unable to access any data created beyond that. Additionally,
past data becomes inaccessible upon the first succeeding write
to the same resource.
The revocation is triggered by an administrator removing
the user’s id from the groupr and groupw access lists. Later,
when new content is published in that group, a new random
key is derived for encrypting the content (Alg. 3, line 1), and
a new envelope is attached to it (Alg. 3, line 2). The revoked
user’s key will not be included in the envelope, and therefore
the user will be unable to access the new group key along
with the newly published content.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
1) ACCESSCONTROL: The ACCESSCONTROL service
is the only stateful component of A-SKY. It is responsible
for generating and storing user keys, and for maintaining
group membership information. Since it deals with sensitive
information, its core runs entirely within enclaves. All external
exchanges are encrypted by using TLS connections that are
terminated inside trusted environments.
We divide the ACCESSCONTROL service into two sub-
components. The first one constitutes the entry-point for
service requests. It is developed in C++, for a total of 3000
lines of code (LoCs).
The other one holds users and groups metadata within a
replicated database. For this purpose, we use a triple-replicated
cluster of MongoDB [29] servers. MongoDB offers out-of-the-
box scale-out support, and is well suited to store denormalized
documents. In order to perform queries against it from the
first sub-component, we ported the official MongoDB client
library [30] to run inside an enclave. Each replica of the
entry-point sub-component is provisioned with the master key
Mk at attestation time; its purpose is to secure the data stored
in the MongoDB backend.
As the storage backend runs outside of enclaves, we make
sure that every piece of data that we store is either hashed
using the HMAC-SHA256 construct or encrypted using
advanced encryption standard (AES) Galois counter mode
(GCM). We thus guarantee that the entity that provides the
MongoDB instances cannot infer any information about users
or groups (barring the size of each group, which is already
leaked in the envelopes). Fig. 2 shows how we organize data
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User
unamee←HMAC(Mk,uname)
ukeye←AES-GCM(Mk,ukey)
usig←HMAC(Mk,
unamee+ukeye)
Group
Members
mnamee←HMAC(Mk,
uname+gname)
mkeye←AES-GCM(Mk,ukey)
. . .
gnamee←HMAC(Mk,gname)
gsig←HMAC(Mk,gnamee+∑
members
(mnamee+mkeye)
)
Fig. 2: Data model of user and group documents stored in MongoDB.
in MongoDB. We use 2 collections, one for users and one
for groups. Each user is stored once in the users collection
and once per group it is a member of. This denormalization
prevents the service provider from inferring which groups a
user belongs to as the attributes of a given user are hashed
or encrypted differently for each representation (i.e., we use
the name of the group as salt when hashing, and different
initialization vectors (IVs) when encrypting). Each document is
wholly signed using HMAC signatures to ensure its integrity.
There are two kinds of users interested in communicating
with the ACCESSCONTROL service: regular users, who need
to retrieve their randomly-generated 256 bit private key, and
administrators, who perform group access control operations.
All these interactions happen through a TLS-encrypted
REST-like protocol. Exchanges are represented in JavaScript
object notation (JSON), for which we slightly modified a C++
library [31]. In order to terminate TLS connections in the
enclave, we use a port of OpenSSL for SGX [32].
Another duty of the ACCESSCONTROL service is to
generate key envelopes upon user requests. An envelope
contains a file key encrypted several times, once per group
member. The file key, as well as the user keys, are 32B
long. We use AES GCM, which generates a tag of 16B for
integrity. Considering the addition of 12B for the IV, each
group member adds 60B to the envelope.
In order to avoid having to perform O(n) decryption trials,
we can index the keys within the envelope (§IV-4). First, we
generate a nonce for each envelope, that we staple to it. Each
user key is then hashed using the SHA224 algorithm, using
the nonce as a salt. This adds 28B to the envelope for each
group member. The list of keys is sorted using the hashes as
a sorting key. As a consequence, readers can look for their
own key by doing a binary search, therefore decreasing the
complexity to O(logn) comparisons followed by one single
decryption. We evaluate the trade-offs as far as enveloping
time and bandwidth usage are concerned in §VI.
2) WRITERSHIELD: The WRITERSHIELD serves two
purposes: protecting cloud storage credentials, and hiding user
identities by proxying their requests to the cloud storage. When
forwarding user requests to write files, the WRITERSHIELD
checks with the ACCESSCONTROL that the query comes from
a user who has the correct permissions to write files. User
requests, including file contents, cross over the enclave bound-
ary. This obviously slows down transmission rates because
of content re-encryption and trusted/untrusted edge transitions.
Therefore, we have also implemented a different variant where
temporary access tokens are given to users, allowing them
to upload their content without the aforementioned content
needing to enter the TEE. Note that the ciphertext digest still
needs to be authenticated by the signing key available in the
TEE-enabled service (necessary for IND-CCA2). In such case,
users are responsible for using appropriate proxies that can
conceal the origin of the request. One approach to hide the
identities is by using peer-to-peer relay networks backed by
enclaves [33]. Also, it is a requirement to only communicate
with the cloud storage using encrypted connections. Even
if the file data is encrypted, the metadata can leak group
information to every entity listening to the network traffic.
We modeled the cloud storage component using Minio [34],
a distributed object store that is fully compatible with the
application programming interfaces (APIs) of Amazon S3.
As we need to perform operations against the cloud storage
from within an enclave, we ported the Java version of the
Minio client library to C++ so that it can run together with the
WRITERSHIELD. These modifications amount to 4000 LoCs
of C++, which we openly release1. Without accounting for
external libraries, the WRITERSHIELD consists of 800 LoCs.
3) Client: As part of our prototype implementation, we
developed a full-featured client in 1200 LoCs of Kotlin. The
client can be set up to operate in all possible configurations of
A-SKY: keys in linear or indexed envelopes, writes through
the WRITERSHIELD, or through a standard proxy onto a
Minio or Amazon S3 storage back-end with short-lived
token-based authentication. Kotlin’s full interoperability with
the Java ecosystem allows us to easily integrate with the
Java Microbenchmark Harness (JMH) [35] and Yahoo! cloud
serving benchmark (YCSB) [14] frameworks that we use to
perform the evaluation of A-SKY (§VI).
4) Deployment: All our components can be independently
replicated to provide availability, fault tolerance or cope with
the load. Therefore, we have packaged our micro-services
as individual containers, which we then orchestrate using
an SGX-aware adaptation of Kubernetes [36]. The proposed
deployment considers that there exists a fast data link between
the organization premises and the infrastructure where the TEE-
enabled micro-services are hosted. As such, our deployment
could further benefit from edge computing gateways sitting at
the border of the organization. Moreover, by considering that
attested TEE micro-services are self-contained with respect
to the hosting environment, other deployment options arise by
elastically handling ACCESSCONTROL and WRITERSHIELD
instances between the organization edge and the user or cloud
premises, if the latter two are equipped with such capabilities.
We leave these deployment options to future work.
VI. EVALUATION
We evaluate the performance and scalability of our solution
by first conducting micro-benchmarks. Then, we use the
well-known YCSB [14] test suite to evaluate the overall
system performance.
All our experiments run on a cluster of 5 SGX-enabled
Dell PowerEdge R330 servers, each having an Intel Xeon
E3-1270 v6 processor and 64GiB of memory. Additionally,
1https://github.com/rafaelppires/anonym-sharing
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TABLE II: Throughput comparison (i.e., group size per second:
|G|/s) of A-SKY cryptographic scheme and BBW [8], isolating
enveloping (Env.) and de-enveloping (Dnv.) operations, in the
standard and efficient decryption (ED) mode.
Env. [|G|/s] Dnv. [|G|/s] Env.ED [|G|/s] Dnv.ED [µs]
BBW 3.3×102 5 ×103 3 ×102 <4
A-SKY 1.9×106 2.5×106 1.2×106 <4
Faster by 3.7 OoM 2.6 OoM 3.6 OoM n/a
we use 3 Dell PowerEdge R630 dual-socket servers, each
equipped with 2 Intel Xeon E5-2683 v4 CPUs and 128GiB of
RAM. One of the latter machines is split in 3 virtual machines
to handle the roles of Kubernetes master, Minio server and
benchmarking client (when a second client is needed). SGX
machines use the latest available microcode revision 0x8e,
and have the Hyper-threading feature disabled to mitigate
the Foreshadow security flaw [37]. Communication between
machines is handled by a Gigabit Ethernet network.
When error bars are shown, they represent the 95%
confidence interval.
1) Micro-benchmarks: Cryptographic Scheme Perfor-
mance. We start the performance evaluation of A-SKY by
isolating and measuring the performance of the underlying cryp-
tographic primitive. We employ the ANOBE scheme defined
by Barth et al. [8] (BBW) as a baseline. Our implementation
of BBW uses an elliptic curve integrated encryption scheme as
the IND-CCA2 public key cryptosystem used by the original
scheme. Both cryptographic schemes key materials (i.e., keys,
curve) are chosen to meet 256 bit of equivalent security
strength [38]. Moreover, we implement the efficient decryption
of BBW, as suggested in the paper by relying on the hardness of
the DH problem, however in the context of much faster elliptic
curves (ECDH). As the content encryption is similarly imple-
mented for the two schemes, we choose to only measure and
present the key enveloping and de-enveloping performance. We
consider that the user keys are available at the time of the calls.
Table II shows the speed of cryptographic key enveloping
and de-enveloping by reporting the number of group members
handled per second. If BBW can envelope groups of only
330 members per second, A-SKY can handle 3.7 orders of
magnitude (OoM) more users per second. The considerable
speed difference is justified by the performance gap between
public key (used by BBW) and symmetric encryption (used
by A-SKY) primitives. Likewise, a performance increase
of 2.6 OoMs is observed for the de-enveloping operation.
BBW provides an efficient decryption mode that can achieve
fast decryption times (less than 4 µs for the highest tested
group size), but with a high cost of only 300 group size
envelopings per second. A-SKY is able to support the same
efficient decryption speed, by performing 1.2 million group
size envelopings per second, a gain of 3.6 OoMs compared
to BBW. Furthermore, as explained in §V, A-SKY produces a
ciphertext of 60B and 88B respectively for the standard and
efficient decryption modes, per each group member, compared
to 126B and 154B bytes per member for BBW.
Scalability. We further evaluate the throughput of operations
performed by administrators when varying the number of
ACCESSCONTROL instances. Requests are distributed among
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Fig. 3: Throughput achieved by ACCESSCONTROL: (i) adding or
revoking users to/from groups of various sizes, and (ii) creating users.
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Fig. 4: Throughput of enveloping a message for groups of various
sizes with varying instances of the ACCESSCONTROL micro-service.
the instances of ACCESSCONTROL by exposing a service
in Kubernetes. Fig. 3 shows our results. The scalability of
adding a user to a group or revoking its rights is limited, as
these operations require to perform one a read-modify-write
(RMW) cycle to check and update the signature of the group
document. The larger the group, the more the operation
takes time as each signature encompasses every user within
the group. This effect could be mitigated by, e.g., batching
multiple operations on a given group together. On the other
hand, the operation that creates users scales linearly with the
number of ACCESSCONTROL instances, allowing more than
5000 user creations per second with 10 instances.
Next, we evaluated the number of keys that can be included
in an envelope per unit of time, also when varying the number
of instances of the ACCESSCONTROL service. A close-to-
linear trend can be observed according to number of instances
in Fig. 4, showing that this operation also benefits from
horizontal scalability. With groups of 1000 to 10 000 members,
the throughput ceases to increase with more than 7 instances
as the MongoDB backend becomes a bottleneck. For smaller
groups, the performance is diminished due to the overhead
associated with each request (e.g., network connection, REST
request, enclave transitions, etc.), although increasing the num-
ber of ACCESSCONTROL instances provides greater benefits.
Additionally, we ran the same experiment with the indexing
feature turned on. For groups of 10 000 users, the throughput is
reduced by 6% to 26%, having a marginal impact on smaller
groups where the performance mostly depends on fixed costs.
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Fig. 5: Throughput vs. latency plot of enveloping a message for
groups of various sizes.
We also evaluated the latency of the enveloping operation
by increasing the throughput until saturation, again with
indexing turned off and on. Looking at Fig. 5, we notice that
for groups which are larger than 100 users, latency increases
linearly according to the group size, while the saturation
throughput decreases linearly.
To evaluate the performance of the WRITERSHIELD, we
conduct two experiments. In the first one, data written to
the cloud is proxied through the TEE. In the second one, the
WRITERSHIELD is only used as a facilitator to obtain temporary
access tokens for the cloud storage, with write operations being
proxied through an NGINX server in TCP reverse-proxy mode.
In order to establish a baseline, we also wrote the data directly
to the cloud storage service, without any intermediary. Results
are shown in Fig. 6. Looking at the bar plot on the left-hand
side, we notice that, for files of 1 kB and 10 kB the difference
in performance is negligible, whereas bigger files cause more
performance degradation when using the token feature. When
the WRITERSHIELD is used to forward data instead (right-hand
side), we see that the throughput increases with the number of
service instances until it seems to plateau at about the same
values as with the tokenized variant. For files of 1MB, adding
WRITERSHIELD instances shows no benefit. This effect hap-
pens due to the saturation of enclave resources acting as a TLS
bridge between clients and the cloud storage server. Overall,
using tokens would be the most efficient approach, although
in this case the client would be responsible for using adequate
proxies in order to hide its identity from the cloud storage.
2) Macro-benchmarks: We use YCSB [14] to observe the
behavior of A-SKY under different usage conditions that are
specific to data serving systems. We implemented an interface
layer to link the benchmarking tool to A-SKY. As our system
is not capable of direct-access writes, update operations
are replaced by RMW operations. In order to capture usage
conditions, we run YCSB workloads A (update heavy), B (read
heavy) and C (read only), to which we add an insert-only
workload. We consider files of 3 different sizes from 1KiB to
1MiB. We simulate 100 000 operations across 64 concurrent
users and report upon the user operation throughput. At times,
we add a second simultaneously-running instance of YCSB that
simulates 8 administrators doing group membership operations.
The administrative operations are equally distributed between
adding a user to a group and revoking one, so that the size
of the user database stays more-or-less constant.
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Fig. 6: Throughput of writing data to the cloud storage in different
ways: directly (baseline), through a TCP proxy using a temporary
token for authentication, and through varying number of in-enclave
WRITERSHIELD instances.
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Fig. 7: User throughput observed by our YCSB-based macro-
benchmark, with various file access patterns, varying file sizes, and
addition of simultaneous administrative operations.
Fig. 7 shows the results of our experiment. One can notice
that the user throughput is not influenced by concurrent
administrative operations, as each type of operation involves
separate components of our architecture. For small files of
1KiB, an increasing proportion of writes causes a degradation
in performance from 4100 ops/s for read only to 628 ops/s for
write-only workloads. With larger 1MiB files, the difference is
more nuanced, with a throughput of 320 ops/s for the read-only
workload compared to 155 ops/s for the write-only workload.
Therefore, the fixed costs are largely dominant when writing
small files (e.g., enveloping the file key), but are increasingly
amortized for larger file sizes. We can also observe that the
throughput in B/s (i.e., multiplying the result in ops/s to the
file size) is largely superior for larger files, as we have already
noticed in Fig. 6. In a nutshell, we retain that the end-user ex-
perience offered by A-SKY is not influenced by concurrent ad-
ministrative operations, and that the overhead of the additional
operations required for writing become smaller for larger files.
VII. CONCLUSION
We introduced A-SKY, an end-to-end system that guarantees
anonymity and confidentiality of shared content (e.g., files).
A-SKY leverages trusted execution environments (TEEs) exclu-
sively for the content sharing operation, while TEE capabilities
are not required for end users consuming the shared content.
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We have introduced a novel anonymous broadcast encryption
(ANOBE) scheme that exploits additional assumptions about
the availability of a TEE compared to state-of-the-art schemes,
in order to achieve fast and practical performance for its op-
erations. We incorporated the novel cryptographic construction
into a scalable system design that leverages micro-services to
elastically scale per the undergoing access control and data
sharing workloads. Results indicate that our cryptographic
scheme is faster than the state-of-the-art ANOBE schemes by
3 orders of magnitude. An end-to-end system that utilizes our
scheme can serve groups of 10 000 users with a throughput of
100 000 key derivations per second per service instance.
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APPENDIX
Security analysis. We discuss the security guarantees of
A-SKY and provide a brief intuition for the formalism of
a reductionist security proof. We hypothesize that A-SKY
achieves indistinguishability with respect to adaptively-chosen
ciphertexts (i.e., IND-CCA2) according to our targeted threat
model (§II). Within IND-CCA2 security, the adversary can be
an active member of the group and therefore can rightfully
decrypt group messages. Such an attacker is allowed to try as
many additional group encryptions (i.e., key envelopings) of
arbitrarily constructed groups, without being able to infer if the
resulted ciphertexts (i.e., envelopes) are pointing to the same
group members. Note that proving A-SKY as IND-CCA2 im-
plicitly assures security guarantees against non adaptive chosen
ciphertext (IND-CCA) and plaintext (IND-CPA) attacks. Differ-
ently than IND-CCA2, IND-CCA assumes that the adversary is
given only one chance to try a set of group encryptions. Within
IND-CPA, also known as semantic security, the adversary is a
passive group member that only observes and does not have the
ciphertext choice capability. Intuitively, the security guarantees
extend to adversaries that are not members of a group.
Before laying out the security proof sketch, we recall
the two pillars of A-SKY: authenticated encryption (AE)
and trusted execution environments (TEEs). AE primitives
are considered secure in the adaptive chosen ciphertext
attack when employing the encrypt-then-mac composition
method [39]. Such a guarantee forces to choose a specific AE
mode for advanced encryption standard (AES), as described
in §V. On the other side, TEEs have been used in the
composition of functional encryption cryptographic primitives
shown to achieve IND-CCA2 guarantees [40]. In the following,
we retain the formalism of Fisch et al. [40] that abstracts
TEEs as a secure hardware scheme.
Theorem 1. Assuming that AE is IND-CCA2 and a TEE
is a secure hardware scheme, then A-SKY is IND-CCA2.
Proof (intuition). We provide the sketch of a reductionist
method that lays the frame for a formal proof. A-SKY can
be seen as a reduction of the anonymous broadcast encryption
scheme of Barth et al. [8] (BBW), by considering two
arguments: (1) AE in conjunction with a secure hardware
scheme replaces the public key encryption (PKE) scheme, and
(2) secure hardware scheme signatures replace the strongly
unforgeable signature. As BBW has been proved IND-CCA2
secure by Libert et al. (Theorem 1 of [9]), relying on the
two aforementioned replacements, one can construct identical
adversary-challenger game steps (Def. 2 in [9]) and employ a
similar sequence of experiments (Appendix A in [9]) that can
prove that A-SKY is immune to chosen ciphertext attacks. As
such, in the formal language of computational security proofs,
A-SKY security relies on the assumption that an attacker
would be unable to employ a polynomial time Turing machine
for breaking the computational hardness of authenticated
encryption and the robustness of TEEs.
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